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Cooperative Profit Sharing in Coalition Based
Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks
Alireza Aram* ,Chandramani Singh, Saswati Sarkar, Anurag Kumar
Abstract—We consider a network in which several ser-
vice providers offer wireless access service to their respective
subscribed customers through potentially multi-hop routes. If
providers cooperate, i.e., pool their resources, such as spectrum
and base stations, and agree to serve each others’ customers,
their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, can potentially
substantially increase through efficient utilization of resources
and statistical multiplexing. The potential of such cooperation can
however be realized only if each provider intelligently determines
who it would cooperate with, when it would cooperate, and
how it would share its resources during such cooperation. Also,
when the providers share their aggregate revenues, developing
a rational basis for such sharing is imperative for the stability
of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using transferable
payoff coalitional game theory. We first consider the scenario
that locations of the base stations and the channels that each
provider can use have already been decided apriori. We show that
the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the allocations
of the channels and the base stations to mobile customers, can
be obtained as solutions of convex optimizations. We next show
that the grand coalition is stable in this case, i.e. if all providers
cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the
providers’ aggregate payoff, while offering each such a share that
removes any incentive to split from the coalition. Next, we show
that when the providers can choose the locations of their base
stations and decide which channels to acquire, the above results
hold in important special cases. Finally, we examine cooperation
when providers do not share their payoffs, but still share their
resources so as to enhance individual payoffs. We show that the
grand coalition continues to be stable.
I. INTRODUCTION
We have witnessed a significant growth in commercial
wireless services in the past few years, and the trend is
likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Satisfaction of
this increasing demand is contingent upon efficient utilization
of the transmission resources, which are either limited (e.g.,
spectrum), or costly (e.g. infrastructure). Currently, most of
the available resources are substantially under-utilized, e.g.,
utilization of licensed spectrum is at times only 15%! ( [1]).
Cooperation among different wireless providers has the
potential for substantially improving the utilization of the
available resources, and should therefore enhance the prolifer-
ation of wireless services. In particular, different providers may
form a coalition and pool their resources, such as spectrum and
infrastructure like base stations and relay nodes, and serve each
others’ customers. Such coalitions may lead to substantially
higher throughput through statistical multiplexing and lower
overall energy consumptions of the customers through multi-
hop relaying. Both of these in turn lead to higher customer
satisfaction, and higher payoff for the providers. Cooperation
*A. Aram & S. Sarkar are in the Dep. of Electrical and Systems Eng.,
University of Pennsylvania. Their contributions have bean supported by NSF
grants NCR- 0238340, CNS-0721308, ECS-0622176. C. Singh & A. Kumar
are in the Electrical Communications Eng., Indian Institute of Science.
may also be instrumental in reducing the costs incurred by the
providers in acquiring spectrum and deploying infrastructure
like base stations. This would again lead to higher net payoff
for the providers. We now elucidate the above benefits using
a sequence of examples.
We first demonstrate how cooperation may substantially
enhance throughput and decrease energy consumption of cus-
tomers. Transmission qualities of available channels randomly
fluctuate with time and space, owing to customer mobility and
propagation conditions. Also, in secondary access networks,
the providers may be secondary users who do not license
channels but communicate when the license holders (primary
users) do not use the channels. Such access opportunities may
only arise sporadically. Since all customers of all providers
do not need to be served simultaneously, and the channels
of different providers may not be unavailable or have poor
transmission qualities simultaneously, spectrum pooling can
mitigate service fluctuations caused by occasional variations
in channel qualities and availabilities, and instantaneous traffic
overloads. This enhances throughput and delivers stringent
service qualities demanded by the customers. In multi-hop
wireless networks (e.g., mesh networks), cooperation increases
the number of available relays (mesh points). This in turn in-
creases the number of multi-hop routes to each customer. Thus,
the total power usage of the customers could significantly
decrease, and total throughput may significantly increase. In
addition, the customers may be induced to serve as relays,
perhaps, in lieu of service discounts. Then the enhancement
in throughput and energy consumption owing to cooperation
magnifies as the coalitions have a larger set of customers, and
therefore a larger number of multi-hop routes.
We now demonstrate how cooperation may substantially
reduce the costs incurred by the providers. A provider can ac-
quire a channel by paying a fixed licensing cost or usage based
charges, or a combination of the two. The first case arises
when the providers are primary users who license the channels
from government agencies, and the other options arise when
they are secondary users who use the channels licensed by
the primaries. When the providers do not cooperate, they may
need to operate as secondary users and opt primarily for usage
based charges, as the volume of their individual traffic may not
justify other options. Since cooperation allows the providers to
pool the customers, the resulting higher aggregate traffic may
allow them to license channels, share the licensing fees and
thereby reduce the individual costs. Next, deploying new base
stations (access points) and subsequently maintaining them, is
one of the major costs in expanding the networks. Cooperation
may allow the individual providers to deliver desired coverage
and throughput guarantees to their customers while deploying
fewer base stations. We demonstrate this advantage using a
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specific scenario which arises in practice. Consider a provider
whose customer base is concentrated in a particular region.
Traffic demand is therefore high in this region and low, but
non-zero, in other regions. This low traffic demand in other
regions is generated primarily because of the mobility of
its customers. In order to provide universal coverage to its
customers (otherwise they would desert), the provider must
deploy base stations throughout, i.e., even in the regions where
its traffic demand is low. These base stations would however be
used very little. If instead, the provider cooperates with another
whose traffic demand is concentrated in a different region,
both may satisfy coverage requirements by deploying base
stations only in the regions where their individual demands
are concentrated. This would in turn significantly reduce the
expenses incurred by each. Such cooperation would also allow
the providers to expand their networks without deploying new
base stations in the regions where they are expanding to.
Several research challenges must however be addressed be-
fore large scale cooperation can be realized. First, commercial
service providers are selfish entities who seek to maximize
their individual payoffs. Therefore, they will cooperate with
others only when this increases their individual incomes. Even
so, a provider is likely to refuse to join a coalition if it
perceives that its share of the aggregate payoff is not propor-
tional to the amount it invested and the wealth it generated.
The former depends on the transmission rates in the channels
it has acquired and the locations and the number of base
stations it has deployed. The latter depends on its customer
base. So, developing a rational basis for determining the
individual shares of the aggregate payoff is imperative. Note
that the aggregate payoff and the individual shares depend on
the cooperation strategies of the providers. Specifically, each
provider needs to decide which providers it would cooperate
with, which channels it is going to use, the locations where it is
going to construct new base stations, and when it should serve
the customers of another provider. The sharing mechanism and
the optimal cooperation strategies for each provider depend on
each other and must be obtained jointly.
We present a framework to determine the optimal decisions
of the providers using tools from cooperative game theory.
The framework also provides a rational basis for sharing
the aggregate payoff. Using tools from transferable payoff
coalitional game theory, we first develop this framework
assuming that the providers can share the aggregate payoff in
any manner they wish to. The first network setup we consider
is an access network where providers pool their spectrum, base
stations and customers. We assume that the locations of the
base stations and the set of channels they have access to, are
determined apriori, but the providers decide how they would
allocate the base stations and the channels of the coalition, to
the customers. We then obtain optimal decision rules for the
providers and a strategy for sharing the resulting aggregate
payoff as solutions of concave optimization problems. This
sharing strategy ensures that it is optimal for all providers to
cooperate (section III). Specifically, if any subset of providers
split from the grand coalition (the coalition of all providers),
irrespective of how they cooperate and the way they share
their aggregate payoff, at least one provider in this subset
will receive less net payoff than when it was in the grand
coalition. In coalitional game terminology, such a sharing
scheme exists only when the core of the game is nonempty.
This result is of interest in itself as many cooperative games
have empty cores, and the specific games we consider do not
satisfy some standard sufficiency conditions for non-emptiness
of the core (e.g., convexity of the game). We then consider the
case where in addition, the providers need to determine the
locations and numbers of base stations, and the set of channels
for each base station. We obtain the optimal decision rules
and the payoff sharing mechanism in some important special
cases of this general problem (section IV). Subsequently, we
generalize the formulations and the results to include multi-
hop transmissions. Finally, we consider a setting where the
providers serve the customers by pooling their resources as
before, but can not share the aggregate payoff in any manner
they wish to. Now, each can only claim the payoff it generates,
i.e., the payoff fetched by its customers minus the cost it
incurs to acquire channels and deploy its base stations. Note
that cooperation may still increase the individual earnings as
the customers are served using the aggregated resources. We
formulate this problem as a nontransferable payoff coalition
game problem (section VI) and show that the grand coalition
is still stable. That is, there always exists a joint action of the
providers that makes it sub-optimal for any subset of them to
leave the grand coalition.
II. MODEL
Consider a network with a set of providers N and a set
of customers. Each provider i owns a set of customers Mi.
In order to serve the customers, provider i intends to open a
number of base stations (access points) from a set of candidate
locations Bi . Let Bi1 ∩Bi2 = ∅ and Mi1 ∩Mi2 = ∅ for i1 =
i2. In figure 1, for instance, N = {1, 2},M1 = {1}, and B2 =
{2, 3}. Let BN and MN be the sets of candidate locations
and customers in the system respectively. We assume that each
provider uses its base stations to serve customers through a set
of channels it has access to. Unless mentioned otherwise, base
stations communicate with the customers through single-hop
links. In order to get access to the channels, providers need to
pay the corresponding charges. Each customer j negotiates a
minimum rate guarantee of mj with its provider apriori.
We assume that each base station k can have access to a
set of channels Ck. That is, base station k is allowed to use
any subset of channels in Ck if the provider associated with
k pays the corresponding charges. For instance in figure 1,
C1 = {1, 4}. We also assume that no two base stations in
a vicinity can have access to the same channel, i.e., Ck1 ∩
Ck2 = ∅ for k1 = k2 if k1 and k2 are in the vicinity. Thus,
the communications of different base stations with different
customers do not interfere. So, channels can be numbered such
that each channel belongs in only one Ck. In other words we
can assume, without loss of generality, that Ck1 ∩Ck2 = ∅ for
all k1 = k2. For example, in figure 1, channels 1 and 3 could
be the same frequency band. But since base stations 1 and 3
are far apart, they can simultaneously use the same frequency
band without interfering with each other. So we can assume
that they are two different channels. Let CN be the set of all
the numbered channels in the system. An important outcome
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Fig. 1. An example of a network with two providers
of the numbering of channels in this way is that specifying a
channel (e.g., l) uniquely determines its base station as well
as provider.
The instantaneous rates the customers receive on differ-
ent channels depend on the current quality of the channels
(which in case of secondary access channels also includes
the current actions of the channels’ primary users) and the
current positions of the customers, which can be random. We
therefore assume that when customer j is served by channel
l, j receives a rate Rlj , a random variable which is a function
of the state of channel l and position of customer j. Let Ωlj
be the state space of Rlj . We assume that |Ωlj | is finite. This
assumption is motivated by the fact that feasible service rates
in any practical communication system belong to a finite set.
Thus, we assume that each channel has a finite number of
states. Also, we can partition the service region in such a
way that the service rates received by the customers inside a
member of the partition do not depend on the locations of the
customers. Let Ω =
∏
l∈CN
j∈MN
Ωlj and P (ω) be the probability
of an outcome ω ∈ Ω.
We now discuss the charging mechanisms used by spectrum
regulators, which are government agencies or license holders
(primary users). The charging mechanisms can be usage based,
membership based, or a combination of these. As the names
imply, membership charge is to be paid for a channel l by a
provider i, if it intends to use l at some point in the operation,
regardless of the amount of usage. Usage based charge for
each channel depends only on the amount of usage and is 0
if the channel is not used. Also, different spectrum regulators
may use different charging mechanisms, and different channels
may provide different statistics for the transmission rates.
The expected payoff a provider earns depends on the rates
it provides to its customers and the cost it incurs in using
the channels. So, in order to maximize its payoff, a provider
may need to judiciously decide (a) the set of channel to be
used by each of its base stations, and (b) allocation of its
customers to the base stations and the corresponding channels.
Note that the allocations may vary with the rates available in
these channels which in turn vary with time. Such payoffs are
likely to increase if multiple providers cooperate, i.e., pool in
their resources (base stations, channels) to serve the joint set
of customers. We now propose a framework based on coalition
game theory so as to capture the above interactions.
Definition II.1. A coalition S ⊆ N is a subset of players (e.g.,
service providers) who cooperate. For a coalition S, BS and
MS are the set of base station candidate locations and cus-
tomers associated with providers in S, and CS = ∪k∈BSCk.
We refer to N as the grand coalition.
Definition II.2. A coalitional game with transferable payoff
< N, v > consists of a finite set N (set of providers)
and a characteristic function v(.) that associates with every
nonempty subset S of N , a real number v(S). For each
coalition S, the number v(S) is the aggregate payoff available
for any arbitrary division among the members of S.
A channel l ∈ Ck can serve customer j only when both are
associated with the same provider or the providers associated
with them are in a coalition. Let random variable αlj ∈ [0, 1]
be the fraction of time channel l serves customer j. αljs
are determined by the allocation scheme. When the provider
associated with customer j is in coalition S, the rate received
by j is a random variable yj(ω) =
∑
l∈CS αlj(ω)Rlj(ω).
When customers associated with provider i receive rates
Yi(ω) = {yj(ω), j ∈ Mi}, they pay i the amount Ui(Yi(ω)),
where Ui(.) is an increasing concave function and equal
to 0 at the origin. Similarly, provider i needs to pay the
spectrum regulators a usage-based cost of Vi(Zi(ω)), where
Zi(ω) = {zl(ω), l ∈ Ci} and zl(ω) =
∑
j∈MS αlj(ω)
is the total fraction of time channel l is used. Vi(.) is an
increasing convex function and equal to 0 at the origin. Then
the total payoff available to a coalition S will be the sum
of the Uis for i ∈ S, reduced by a) the sum of the Vis
for l ∈ CS , and b) channels’ membership-based charges and
the costs of opening base stations. Therefore, providers in a
coalition S have to decide which base stations to open, which
channels’ memberships to buy, and how to schedule those base
stations and channels to customers, based on their positions
and utility and cost functions so as to maximize their total
payoff, subject to possible minimum rate constraints. Now
v(S) is the maximum aggregate payoff available to a coalition
S. We will show in the next sections how v(S) can be obtained
as a solution of an optimization problem. This optimization
problem presents the optimum cooperation strategies among
providers and optimal values for the decision variables. Note
that the customers might also have maximum service rate
constraints. This, however, is captured in our model, since the
utility functions are concave and thus include upper-bounded
functions.
Another important question now is how should these
providers divide the aggregate payoff among each other. To
answer this question, we introduce a solution concept in
coalitional games known as the core. The idea behind the
core in a cooperative game is analogous to that behind a Nash
equilibrium of a noncooperative game: an outcome is stable if
no deviation is profitable.
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Definition II.3. For any real valued vector x =
{x1, x2, . . . , xn} and any coalition S, we let x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi.
Such a vector is said to be an imputation if x(N) = v(N) and
xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N. The core of the coalitional game
with transferable payoff 〈N, v〉 is the set of all imputations x
for which x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N . In other words
C = {x ∈ Rn :
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N),
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S),∀S ⊂ N}.
The significance of the core, comes from the fact that, every
imputation in the core renders the grand coalition stable. To see
this, let providers form the grand coalition and share v(N) as
per an imputation x ∈ C. Now, suppose a set of providers S ⊂
N split from the grand coalition and form a separate coalition
to share their aggregate payoff v(S) as per w. A provider i ∈
S, however, would agree to split from the grand coalition only
if wi > xi. This implies that v(S) =
∑
i∈S wi >
∑
i∈S xi,
and thus contradicts the fact that x ∈ C. Therefore, the grand
coalition is stable. This is a globally desirable outcome, since
the grand coalition maximizes the aggregate payoff.
The core in several coalitional games is empty, i.e., the
grand coalition cannot be stabilized, even if the grand coalition
maximizes the aggregate payoff (Example 260.3 p. 260 [2]),
and in general it is NP-hard to determine whether the core
of a coalitional game is nonempty( [3]). Convexity1 of a
game is a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the
core. The games we consider, however, are not convex (
[4]). Nevertheless, in the following sections we show that the
cores of the coalitional games for different network setups are
nonempty, and we also obtain imputations in the respective
cores.
III. SPECTRUM POOLING GAME
In this section, we formulate the cooperation among
providers as a transferable payoff coalitional game and prove
that it has a nonempty core. We assume that all providers
have already decided where to open their base stations and
which channels memberships to buy. In this scenario, the only
decision variables to be determined are the scheduling of base
stations and channels to customers. Thus, for simplicity, we
assume that all base station opening and channel membership
costs are zero. Consider the following convex optimization
problem which returns v(S) for any coalition S ⊆ N if
feasible, else v(S) = −∞.
P(S):- Max:∑ i∈S
ω∈Ω
Ui(Yi(ω))P (ω)− Vi(Zi(ω))P (ω)
Subject to:
1) yj(ω) =
∑
l∈CS αlj(ω)Rlj(ω), j ∈ MS , ω ∈ Ω
2) zl(ω) =
∑
j∈MS αlj(ω), l ∈ CS , ω ∈ Ω
3) ∑l∈CS αlj(ω) ≤ 1, j ∈ MS , ω ∈ Ω
4) ∑j∈MS αlj(ω) ≤ 1, l ∈ CS , ω ∈ Ω
5) ∑ω∈Ω P (ω)yj(ω) ≥ mj , j ∈ MS
6) αlj(ω), yj(ω), zl(ω) ≥ 0, j ∈ MS , l ∈ CS , ω ∈ Ω
Constraints (3) ensure that the total fraction of time each
customer is served, is at most 1. A channel can serve at most
the whole fraction of time by (4). Constraints (5) guarantee
1A coalitional game is convex if v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T )
for all S, T ⊆ N .
the minimum service rates. Note that the decision variables of
the grand coalition can always be chosen as the union of the
decision variables of the members of any partition of N . This
means that the payoff of the grand coalition is at least equal
to the sum of the payoffs of members of any partition.
The following example elucidates how cooperation can alter
the optimal decision variables of providers 2.
Example III.1. Consider the network in figure 1 with N =
{1, 2} and Bi = Ci = {i} (we do not consider base station
3 or channel 3 and 4 here.). Let R12 = R21 = R22 = P and
R11 = R23 = Q, where Q < P , and Rlj = 0 otherwise. Let
mj = Q2 for j = 1 . . . 3. Suppose the payoffs equal the sum
of the service rates. Then we have v({1}) = Q and v({2}) =
P+Q
2 . But if the two providers cooperate, with α11 = α22 = 0,
α12 = 1 and α21 = α23 = 12 , we have v({1, 2}) = 3P+Q2 .
So, cooperation helps providers make a better use of their
base stations, and as a result increases the aggregate payoff.
Using the duality technique, we now show that this
game has a nonempty core. Let λ, β ∈ R|MS×Ω|,
ν, γ ∈ R|CS×Ω|, and ρ ∈ R|MS |. Let giω(λ, ρ) =
maxyj(ω)≥0
(
P (ω)Ui(Yi(ω)) +
∑
j∈Mi yj(ω)(λj(ω) +
ρjP (ω))
)
and hiω(ν) = maxzl(ω)≥0
( − P (ω)Vi(Zi(ω)) +∑
l∈Ci zl(ω)νl(ω)
)
. Then we have the following as the dual
of P(S):
D(S):- Minimize: ∑i∈S
(∑
ω∈Ω(giω +hiω)+
∑
l∈Ci
ω∈Ω
γl(ω)+
∑
j∈Mi
ω∈Ω
βj(ω)−
∑
j∈Mi mjρj
)
Subject to:
I) λj(ω)Rlj(ω) + νl(ω) + βj(ω) + γl(ω) ≥ 0, l ∈ CS , j ∈
MS , ω ∈ Ω
II) βj(ω), γl(ω), ρj ≥ 0, l ∈ CS , j ∈ MS , ω ∈ Ω
Formulate D(N) by appropriately defining vectors
λ, β, γ, ν, ρ and let D constitutes the set of optimal solutions
of D(N). Clearly, D(S) is feasible for each S ⊆ N . Thus,
D = ∅. Let
I ={x∗ ∈ R|N | : x∗i =
∑
ω∈Ω
(
giω(λ∗, ρ∗) + hiω(ν∗)
)
+
∑
j∈Mi
ω∈Ω
β∗j (ω)−
∑
j∈Mi
mjρ
∗
j +
∑
l∈Ci
ω∈Ω
γ∗l (ω) for some
(λ∗, ν∗, β∗.γ∗, ρ∗) ∈ D}
Here is the main result:
Theorem III.1. I = ∅ and I ⊆ C.
Discussion: Note that D(S) is a convex optimization with
linear constraints. Therefore, its optimal solution and thereby
an imputation in the core can be computed in polynomial time
[5]. In future, whenever we obtain an imputation in the core
using the duality technique, the same argument follows.
Proof of theorem III.1: Since D = ∅, I = ∅. We show
that for an arbitrary x∗ ∈ I, x∗ ∈ C. Note that, since Uis and
Vis are (increasing) concave and convex functions respectively,
the objective function of P(S) is concave. Also, the constraints
2In all the examples we assume stationary networks, i.e., |Ω| = 1. Thus
all random quantities become deterministic.
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of P(S) are all linear. Therefore, P(S) is maximizing a concave
function over a convex set. Thus, strong duality holds.
Now, consider an arbitrary x∗ ∈ I, corresponding to one
(λ∗, ν∗, β∗.γ∗, ρ∗) ∈ D. Clearly x∗(N) = ∑i∈N x∗i is the
optimal value of D(N). Since D(S) is the dual of P(S) for
each S ⊆ N , by strong duality x∗(N) = v(N). Now we only
need to show that x∗(S) ≥ v(S) for any S ⊂ N . If P(S)
is infeasible, the claim is trivial for v(S) = −∞. Suppose
P(S) is feasible. By strong duality, v(S) equals the optimum
value of D(S). Consider the sub-vectors λ∗S , ν∗S , β∗S .γ∗S , ρ∗S
consisting of the components of λ∗, ν∗, β∗.γ∗, ρ∗ in S. Clearly
these sub-vectors constitute a feasible solution of D(S) and
x∗(S) is the value of the objective function of D(S) for the
above feasible solution. Therefore, the optimal value of D(S)
is a lower bound for x∗(S), i.e., x∗(S) ≥ v(S).
Now we discuss how this framework can provide useful
insights about the relation between a provider’s payoff share,
the resources it contributes, and the wealth it generates.
Among the resources in possession of a provider, one could
be more constrained than the others. For instance, a provider
might have a lot of customers, but few base stations. Then,
increasing the number of base stations could boost the payoff
generated by the provider, while adding to the number of
customers might not change it. The situation may be reversed
for a different provider. Using the rule of thumb that more
demand adds to the value of an asset, an intuitive observation
then is that in a coalition, the provider that shares more of the
resource that is sought most by the majority of the members of
the coalition, is likely to receive a larger share of the aggregate
payoff. The following example will further elucidate this.
Example III.2. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, |M1| = 5, and |M2| =
|M3| = 2. Also, let |C1| = 2, |C2| = 3, and |C3| = 4.
Suppose Rlj = P for all l ∈ CN and j ∈ MN . Let the
payoffs be equal to sum of the customers’ service rates. It is
easy to check that, v({i}) = 2P for i ∈ N , v({1, 2}) = 5P ,
v({1, 3}) = 6P , v({2, 3}) = 4P , and v({1, 2, 3}) = 9P .
Thus, C = {(x1, x2, x3) : x1 + x2 + x3 = 9P, xi ≥ 2P, x1 +
x2 ≥ 5P, x1 + x3 ≥ 6P, x2 + x3 ≥ 4p}. Note that provider 1
has more customers which are sought by 2 and 3. Note that all
providers receive the same payoff when they do not cooperate.
Now, if they form the grand coalition and share the aggregate
payoff as per an imputation picked randomly from the core,
provider 1 is likely to receive the largest share. This is in
agreement with our intuitive observation. Another important
issue to be pointed out is that, the providers’ share of the
aggregate payoff is usually largely determined by parameters
other than their decision variables. For instance, the number of
customers here is not a decision variable and yet it is critical
in determining the payoff shares.
Remark: A provider can decide how to upgrade its re-
sources, based on the above observation. For instance, in
example III.2, if provider 2 can somehow increase its customer
base, its share increases, although the aggregate payoff remains
the same. This could be a direction for future work.
IV. BASE STATION GAME
We now examine cooperation in a setup where providers
can decide which channels to rent and where to open base
stations. More specifically, a provider i needs to choose a
subset of candidate locations Bi for the base stations it is
going to open. Let fk be the cost of opening base station k.
Let bk = 1 if base station k is open and 0 otherwise. Also,
i should determine which channels, base station k ∈ Bi will
have access to, which are selected from the set Ck. Once the
provider pays the corresponding channel membership costs
(i.e., the channel is open), the base station is allowed to use
those channels to serve the customers anytime during the
operation. Let gl be the membership-based charge of using
channel l ∈ Ck. Let cl = 1 if base station k is allowed to use
channel l and 0 otherwise. If cl = 1, the associated provider
has to pay the corresponding membership fee, gl, a constant
number, plus usage-based charges which was discussed before.
A channel l ∈ Ck, for some k ∈ Bi, can serve customer j if
a) Base station k is open, b) Channel l is open, and c)Base
station k and customer j are associated with the same provider
or the providers associated with them are in a coalition. We
assume mj = 0 for all j ∈ MN . Note that, bk and cl are
deterministic variables and cannot depend on ω, in contrast to
αlj(ω)s that are decided to best suit the respective outcome
ω ∈ Ω. We assume that all utility and cost functions are linear,
and ulj(ω) ∈ R is the payment of customer j minus the usage-
based charges of channel l, per unit of time of service. Now
we have the tools to formulate the optimization which provides
v(S) for all S ⊆ N .
PG(S):- Max:
∑
l∈CS
j∈MS
ω∈Ω
αlj(ω)ulj(ω)P (ω) −
∑
k∈BS fkbk −
∑
l∈CS glcl
Subject to:
1) ∑l∈CS αlj(ω) ≤ 1, j ∈ MS , ω ∈ Ω
2) ∑j∈MS αlj(ω) ≤ cl, l ∈ CS , ω ∈ Ω
3) cl ≤ bk, l ∈ Ck, k ∈ BS
4) αlj(ω) ∈ [0, α], l ∈ CS , j ∈ MS , ω ∈ Ω
5) bk, cl ∈ {0, 1}, l ∈ CS , k ∈ BS
Constraints (1) ensure that the total fraction of time a customer
is being served, is upper bounded by 1. If a channel is
open, the the fraction of time it can serve is at most 1,
and it cannot serve otherwise, by constraints (2). Constraints
(3) guarantee that only opened base stations can have open
channels. Unless mentioned otherwise we assume α = 1
which renders constraints (4) trivial. We discuss the function
of constraints (4) for α < 1 in Subsection IV-C .
We now elucidate the impact of cooperation on the total
payoff, as well as the providers’ decision variables, using the
following example.
Example IV.1. Consider the setup in figure 1 with B1 =
C1 = {1} and B2 = C2 = {2, 3}, where gl = 0 for l ∈ CN ,
f1 = 0, and f2 = f3 = f . Let R11 = R21 = R23 = Q,
R12 = R22 = R33 = P , and Rlj = 0 otherwise. Let mj = 0
for j = 1 . . . 3, f < P , and Q < P . Let payoffs consist of the
sum of the service rates. Now v({1}) = Q. Also v({2}) =
max[P − f, 2P − 2f ] and v({1, 2}) = max[2P − f, 2P +
Q − 2f ], where the former payoffs are the result of opening
just base station 3, while the latter ones occur when both are
open. Intuitively, if provider 2 cooperates with 1, opening base
station 2 may not be necessary. In fact if Q < f < P , opening
both base stations 2 and 3 is optimal when not in coalition,
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while opening just base station 3 is optimal under cooperation.
This is in agreement with the intuition that opening a base
station in the area that is covered by other base stations might
be redundant. However, if there is a relatively large traffic
demand in that area, opening the base station could become
optimal. For instance, in our example, if R21 = P , v({1, 2}) =
max[2P − f, 3P − 2f ] and it is optimal to open both base
stations.
Note that the same approach taken in section III to show
that the core is nonempty, is inadequate here. The reason is
that, this optimization problem involves integer variables and
therefore strong duality does not hold in general. However,
there are important special cases where similar results extend.
A. Case I
Consider the special case where customers do not move and
the quality of the channels do not vary with time, i.e. |Ω| = 1.
We also assume that an open base station is allowed to use
only one given channel, which has no membership fee, i.e.
Ck = {k} for all k ∈ BN , and cl = 0 for all l ∈ CN . Then
PG(S) will reduce to the following IP:
Pb(S):- Maximize:
∑
k∈BS
j∈MS
αkjukj −
∑
k∈BS fkbk
Subject to:
1) ∑k∈BS αkj ≤ 1, j ∈ MS
2) ∑j∈MS αkj ≤ bk, k ∈ BS
3) αkj ≥ 0, k ∈ BS , j ∈ MS
4) bk ∈ {0, 1}, k ∈ BS
In the following we proceed to prove that the core of the
coalitional game < N, v >, with characteristic function v(.)
given by Pb(S), is nonempty. The proof consists of three steps.
Step I) Consider the coalitional game < N, vˆ >, where N is
the same set of providers and the characteristic function vˆ(.) is
given by the LP, Prelaxed(S). Prelaxed(S) is the linear relaxation
of Pb(S), where the constraints bk ∈ {0, 1} are now replaced
by bk ∈ [0, 1]. We show that the core of the coalitional game
< N, vˆ >, Cˆ, is nonempty.
Using λ ∈ R|MS |, and ν, γ ∈ R|BS |, we construct the
following LP as the dual of Prelaxed(S)
Drelaxed(S):- Minimize:
∑
j∈MN λj +
∑
k∈BN γk
Subject to:
1) λj + νk ≥ ukj , k ∈ BN , j ∈ MN
2) νk − γk ≤ fk, k ∈ BN
3) λj , νk, γk ≥ 0, k ∈ BN , j ∈ MN
Let Drelaxed constitute the set of optimal solutions of
Drelaxed(N). Define: Ib = {x∗ ∈ R|N | : x∗i =
∑
j∈Mi λ
∗
j +∑
k∈Bi γ
∗
k for some (λ∗, ν∗, β∗, γ∗) ∈ Drelaxed}.
Theorem IV.1. Ib = ∅, and Ib ⊆ Cˆ
Proof: The proof is the same as that presented in the
proof of theorem III.1.
Step II) In the following we prove that If Pb(N) has
zero integrality gap (i.e., Prelaxed(N) has an integral optimal
solution), the core of < N, v >, C, includes the core of the
coalitional game < N, vˆ >, and consequently Ib ⊆ C.
Theorem IV.2. If Pb(N) has zero integrality gap, i.e. v(N) =
vˆ(N), then Cˆ ⊆ C.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary imputation x ∈ Cˆ. We show
that x ∈ C. We need to check the two properties of a core
element. First note that, by the hypothesis, v(N) = vˆ(N) =
x(N). Second, x ∈ Cˆ implies that x(S) ≥ vˆ(S), S ⊂ N ,
and because any feasible solution of Pb(S) is feasible for
Prelaxed(S), we have vˆ(S) ≥ v(S), S ⊂ N . Thus, x(S) ≥
v(S), S ⊂ N . Hence, x ∈ C and the lemma follows.
Step III) Finally, we prove in technical report [4] that
Pb(N) has zero integrality gap.
Here is the main result
Theorem IV.3. Ib = ∅, and Ib ⊆ C
Proof: Using theorems IV.1, IV.2, and the fact that
v(N) = vˆ(N), the claim immediately follows.
B. Case II
Consider the case, where now opposite to that in Subsection
IV-A, fk = 0 for all k ∈ BN and channels can have
membership costs. Each base station can now rent more than
one channel. Also, |Ω| = 1. Under these assumptions, PG(S)
reduces to an IP with the exact same structure as Pb(S). Thus,
all the formulations and results extend.
C. Case III
We consider another special case. Suppose that in order to
maintain a certain degree of fairness in the network, providers
impose an upper bound on the scheduling decision variables,
that is αlj(ω) ≤ α for all l ∈ CN , j ∈ MN , ω ∈ Ω, for an
α such that α.|CN | ≤ 1 (Hence constraints (4) in PG(S)).
With this assumption, the characteristic function vf(.), is then
given by an optimization problem Pf(S) derived by omitting
constraints (1) in PG(S). In the following, we proceed to
show that the core of the coalitional game < N, vf >, Cf ,
is nonempty.
Let τ ∈ R|CS×Ω| and ϕ ∈ R|CS |. Define3
hSk (τ, ϕ) = maxαlj∈[0,α], bk,cl∈{0,1}
( − fkbk −∑
l∈Ck glcl +
∑
l∈Ckj∈MS
ω∈Ω
αlj(ω)ulj(ω)P (ω) −
∑
l∈Ck
ω∈Ω
τl(ω)(
∑
l∈Ck
j∈MS
αlj(ω)− cl)+ −
∑
l∈Ck ϕl(cl − bk)+
)
Df(S): Minimize:
∑
k∈BS h
S
k (τ, ϕ)
Subject to: τ, ϕ ≥ 0
Formulate Df(N) by defining vectors τ and ϕ appropriately.
Let Df constitute the set of optimal solutions of Df(N).
Note that Df = ∅. Now let If = {x∗ ∈ R|N | : x∗i =∑
k∈Bi h
N
k (τ
∗, ϕ∗), for some (τ∗, ϕ∗) ∈ Df}.
Theorem IV.4. If = ∅, and If ⊆ Cf .
We prove this theorem in technical report [4] using strong
duality for the extended dual problem.
V. COOPERATION IN MULTI-HOP NETWORKS
We now study cooperation among providers in multi-hop
networks. Intuitively, cooperation in multi-hop networks has
all the advantages of that in single hop ones, which is sharing
the base stations and spectrum. In addition, it has another ben-
efit which we call power sharing. That is, when the providers
cooperate, they can redirect their traffic through possibly better
3A+ max[A, 0]
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multi-hop routes, which in turn could reduce their transmission
power consumption. In this section, we generalize our model
to incorporate multi-hop networks. Subsequently, we examine
the spectrum pooling coalitional game with transferable payoff
in this model and show that the core of the game is nonempty.
Consider a network, where a provider deploys a set of
base stations (which might include mobile base stations), to
serve a set of customers. Customers communicate with base
stations via potentially multi-hop routes, that is, customers can
relay packets of other customers. However, when a customer
relays others’ packets, it uses power without transmitting its
own packets. In order to motivate customers, providers agree
to discount their charges based on how much they relay.
Nevertheless, a customer might want to have a maximum
relaying agreement with its provider. In this type of networks,
providers must decide the communication routes as well as the
allocation of base stations. If now a group of providers agree
to cooperate by pooling their base stations and customers, not
only can they benefit from sharing other’s base stations, but
they also enjoy a larger set of relay nodes. This, in turn, can
increase the capacity of the network, as well as its power
efficiency 4. Therefore, cooperation in multi-hop networks has
even higher potential than that in a single hop network. We
now present a framework that captures all these issues.
Let N be the set of providers. Let Bi and Mi be the sets
of provider i’s base stations and customers respectively. We
assume that each provider uses its base stations to serve the
customers through possibly multi-hop routes. We also assume
that each customer can communicate with all base stations
and customers. However, the transmission rates depend on the
quality of the channels and the source-destination distances,
which could be random. Each customer can either communi-
cate directly with base stations, or act as a relay and transmit
packets to other customers. Then the service rate of a customer
j is defined as the total rate at which j’s packets are delivered
to any base station, either via a single or multi-hop route5. Let
mj be the minimum service rate requirement of customer j.
Suppose customer j can transmit to a base station or another
customer l at a rate equal to Rjl, a random variable which is a
function of the quality of the channel and location of j and l.
Let Ω be the state space of the channel qualities and customer
locations. We assume |Ω| is finite. Let ω be an outcome of
this state space and P(ω) be its probability.
Let S ⊆ N be a coalition of providers. Suppose, a base
station k and a customer j, or two customers, can communicate
only when both are associated with the same provider or the
providers associated with them are in a coalition. Let random
variable βj2j1l ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of time, customer j1
transmits packets of customer j2, to base station or customer
l. Without loss of generality we can assume that βj2j1l = 0
for l = j1 or l = j2. βj2j1ls are determined by the allocation
scheme.
We assume that base stations in the same area use different
4Note that for certain customers, the increase in the power usage may not
be proportional to that in their service rates, but cooperation increases the
power efficiency of the network as a whole.
5We consider downlink communications. The model and results can easily
be extended to the case where communications involve both uplinks down-
links.
channels, and thus their communications do not interfere with
each other. Also, suppose that customers and base stations
cannot transmit or receive through multiple channels simulta-
neously, or transmit and receive at the same time. Therefore,
the necessary and sufficient condition for the simultaneous
transmissions to be successful is that the set of transmitter-
receiver pairs form a matching. Similar transmission models
have extensively been assumed in related contexts [6], [7].
Using a result in graph theory, a sufficient condition for
feasibility of a set of βj2j1ls is that the fraction of time each
customer or base station is communicating be upper bounded
by θ, where θ is a constant between 0 and 1 which depends
on the topology of the network [8]. For instance θ = 1 for
bipartite networks and 23 for general networks. We assume this
to be also a necessary condition for feasibility of a scheduling.
We now discuss the mechanism which determines the
payoffs providers receive and the costs they incur from
serving the customers. Let Tj be the maximum fraction of
time customer j relays. When the provider associated with
customer j1 is in coalition S, j1 receives a service rate equal to
the random variable yj1(ω) =
∑
k∈BS ,j2∈MS Rj2k(ω)β
j1
j2k
(ω).
Besides, j1 relays the traffic for tj1 fraction of time, where
tj1(ω) =
∑
j2,j3∈MS ,k∈BS (β
j2
j3j1
(ω) + βj2j1j3(ω) + β
j2
j1k
(ω)).
Suppose when a node j receives a service rate yj and relays
traffic tj fraction of time, it pays the associated provider,
an amount of Uj(yj , tj), where Uj(y, t) is a concave
function increasing in y and decreasing in t. Let random
variables pjl(ω) represent the power usage per unit time of
transmission of customer j to base station or customer l.
Then a customer j1 in a coalition S, has a total power usage
of zj1(ω) =
∑
l∈BS∪MS ,j2∈MS β
j2
j1l
(ω)pj1l(ω). This in turn
inflicts a cost equal to Vj(zj), where Vj(.) is an increasing
convex function.
The net aggregate payoff available to providers in a coalition
is the difference between their utilities and costs. Therefore,
in order to maximize their aggregate payoff, providers in
a coalition S must decide the routes along which they
communicate with each node, and schedule the base stations
to those routes based on the position of customers, and payoff
and cost functions, subject to minimum rate and maximum
relaying constraints. Let v(S) represent the maximum
aggregate payoff available to a coalition S. Then, v(S) is
the optimal value of the objective function of the following
convex optimization:
Pm (S): Maximize:
∑
ω∈Ω
j∈MS
P(ω)Uj(yj(ω), tj(ω)) −
∑
ω∈Ω
j∈MS
P(ω)Vj(zj(ω))
Subject to:
1) yj1(ω) =
∑
k∈BS
j2∈MS
Rj2k(ω)β
j1
j2k
(ω), j1 ∈ MS , ω ∈ Ω.
2) tj1(ω) =
∑
j2,j3∈MS\j1
k∈BS
(βj2j3j1(ω) + β
j2
j1j3
(ω) +
βj2j1k(ω)), j1 ∈ MS , ω ∈ Ω.
3) zj1(ω) =
∑
l∈BS∪MS
j2∈MS
βj2j1l(ω)pj1l(ω), j1 ∈ MS , ω ∈ Ω.
4) ∑j3∈MS (β
j2
j1j3
(ω)Rj1j3(ω) + β
j2
j3j1
(ω)Rj3j1(ω)) =∑
k∈BS β
j2
j1k
(ω)Rj1k, j1 = j2 ∈ MS , ω ∈ Ω.
5) tj(ω) +
∑
l∈BS∪MS β
j
jl(ω) ≤ θ, j ∈ MS , ω ∈ Ω.
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6) ∑j∈MS
ω∈Ω
P(ω)yj(ω) ≥ mj , j ∈ MS .
7) tj(ω) ≤ Tj , j ∈ MS , ω ∈ Ω.
8) βj2j1l(ω) ≥ 0, j1, j2 ∈ MS , l ∈ BS ∪MS , ω ∈ Ω
Constraints 4 ensure that the set of βj2j1ls satisfy the flow
feasibility constraints, while constraints 5 guarantee that they
constitute a feasible allocation. Constraints 6 and 7 impose
minimum service and maximum relaying guarantees, respec-
tively.
We can now form the dual problem and define a set I the
same as in section III. Theorem III.1 extends.
VI. NONTRANSFERABLE PAYOFF GAME
We have so far discussed cooperation among providers,
using coalitional games with transferable payoff framework.
We assumed that the providers can share the aggregate payoff.
This may not always be the case. For instance, providers might
not have a unique method of cost or payoff appraisal agreed
on, or even if they have, it may not be possible to confirm their
income reports. Also, a provider’s satisfaction could depend
on factors that cannot be converted to monetary units, and
thus cannot be shared with others. Under these circumstances,
the payoff of each provider could only consist of whatever it
receives from its own subscribers reduced by its own operation
costs. Nevertheless, cooperation among providers may still be
beneficial.
Example VI.1. Consider example III.1, where now the payoff
of each provider is the service rate of its own customer. Let
Q < P < 2Q. Consider the allocation: α11 = 3P−Q4P , α12 =
Q+P
4P , α21 =
Q
2P , α22 =
P−2Q
2P , and α23 =
1
2 . Then the payoffs
are x1 =
Q(5P−Q)
4P > v({1}) and x2 = 3P+Q4 > v({2}).
Thus cooperation between the two providers is beneficial. Now
consider the optimum allocation that maximized the aggregate
payoff in example III.1. Then, x1 = P2 and x2 = P + Q2 .
Note that, x1 < v({1}) = Q. Thus in nontransferable payoff
framework, the allocation that maximizes the aggregate payoff
may not motivate the providers to cooperate.
In these cases, we need to resort to the theory of nontrans-
ferable payoff cooperative games to develop a framework for
cooperation among providers. In doing so, we first take a short
detour to the basic theory of nontransferable payoff games.
A. Nontransferable payoff cooperative games
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players. A coalition S ⊆
N is a subset of players who cooperate. Let A(S) be the joint
action space of the players in coalition S. Each joint action
a ∈ A(S) leads to a payoff vector x ∈ R|S|. Each coalition
S has an associated set v(S) defined as v(S) = {x ∈ R|S| :
∃y ∈ R|S|, y ≥ x,y corresponds to some a ∈ A(S)}.
Now the stage is set to introduce the following definition
[9].
Definition VI.1. A non transferable payoff cooperative game
is a pair (N , V ), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players,
and V = (v(S) ∈ R|S|,S ⊆ N ) is a family of sets satisfying
1) For each S, v(S) is a closed set.
2) If y ∈ v(S) and x ∈ R|S| with x ≤ y, then x ∈ v(S).
3) The set of vectors in v(S) in which each player in S
receives no less than the maximum that he can obtain by
himself is a nonempty, bounded set.
Any x ∈ v(N ) is called a feasible payoff profile. The core
C of the game is the set of feasible payoffs, which can not be
blocked by any coalition. Formally,
C = {x ∈ v(N ) : ∀S, /∃y ∈ v(S) such that yi > xi ∀i ∈ S}
In example VI.1, for instance, the pair (Q(5P−Q)4P ,
3P+Q
4 )
is indeed in the core, since it is not blocked by any coali-
tion. The core in nontransferable payoff cooperative games
stabilizes the grand coalition, similar to its transferable payoff
counterpart (section II).
B. Nonemptiness of the core of spectrum pooling game
Consider a spectrum pooling game (section III) with the
assumption that customers do not move and the quality of
channels do not change with time, i.e. |Ω| = 1. Now, let
providers form a coalition S. A joint action of the providers
will be of the form {αlj , l ∈ CS , j ∈ MS}, which must satisfy
the following feasibility constraints.
1) ∑j∈MS αlj ≤ 1, l ∈ CS .
2) ∑l∈CS αlj ≤ 1, j ∈ MS .
3) ∑l∈CS αljRlj ≥ mj , j ∈ MS .
4) αlj ≥ 0, l ∈ CS , j ∈ MS .
Suppose that joint (feasible) action space is nonempty. Cus-
tomer j associated with provider i receives rate yj =∑
l∈CS αljRlj and channel l is used zl =
∑
j∈MS αlj fraction
of time. Let yi = {yj , j ∈ Mi} and zi = {zl, l ∈ Ci}. Then,
the corresponding payoff vector will be (Ui(yi)− Vi(zi), i ∈
S). Now, we show that the core of this game is nonempty. We
need the following definitions.
Definition VI.2. A collection (of coalitions) T ⊂ 2N \∅ is
called balanced if there exist non-negative weights (λS ,S ∈
T ) such that ∑S∈T : i∈S λS = 1, ∀i ∈ N .
Definition VI.3. A game is balanced if for every balanced
collection T , if u ∈ Rn and uS ∈ v(S) for all S ∈ T , then
u ∈ v(N ).6
Finally, we will make use of the following theorem [9].
Theorem VI.1. A balanced game always has a nonempty core.
Here is the main result.
Theorem VI.2. The non transferable payoff spectrum pooling
game described above, is balanced and hence has a nonempty
core.
Proof: Consider a balanced collection of coalitions T . Let
(λS ,S ∈ T ) be the corresponding non-negative weights. Also,
let u ∈ Rn be such that uS ∈ v(S) for all S ∈ T , i.e, there
exist joint actions {αSlj , l ∈ CS , j ∈ MS} for all S ∈ T that
satisfy constraints 1 − 4 and ui ≤ Ui(ySi ) − Vi(zSi ), ∀i ∈ S
where {ySi , i ∈ S}, denote the rate vectors corresponding tojoint action {αSlj , k ∈ CS , j ∈ MS}, and {zSi , i ∈ S} is its
corresponding channel utilization vectors. Now, define a joint
6For any x ∈ Rn, xS ∈ R|S| is defined by xSi = xi, ∀i ∈ S.
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action {αlj , l ∈ CN , j ∈ MN } as αlj =
∑
S∈T : l∈CSj∈MS
λSαSlj .
The further proof consists of two steps.
Step 1: {αlj , k ∈ CN , j ∈ MN } satisfy constraints 1 − 4,
corresponding to the grand coalition N .
∑
j∈MN
αlj =
∑
j∈MN
∑
S∈T : l∈CSj∈MS
λSαSlj
=
∑
S∈T : l∈CS
λS
∑
j∈MS
αSlj
≤
∑
S∈T : l∈CS
λS
=
∑
S∈T : i∈S
λS (where l ∈ Ci)
= 1
Similarly, one can show that constraints 2 and 3 are also
satisfied. Constraint 4 is trivial.
Step 2: ui ≤ Ui(yi) − Vi(zi), ∀i ∈ N where {yi, i ∈
N} and {zi, i ∈ N}, denote the rate and channel utilization
vectors corresponding to joint action {αlj , k ∈ CN , j ∈ MN },
respectively. It is easy to check that the rate received by a
customer j, yj =
∑
S∈T : i∈S λSy
S
j (where j ∈ Mi), i.e., for
all j, yj is a convex combination of {ySj ,S ∈ T : i ∈ S},
where j ∈ Mi. Similarly, zl =
∑
S∈T : i∈S λSz
S
l (where l ∈
Ci). Since Ui(.) and Vi(.) are increasing concave and convex
functions respectively, for each provider i,
Ui(yi)− Vi(zi) ≥
∑
S∈T : i∈S
λS
(
Ui(ySi )− Vi(zSi )
)
≥
∑
S∈T : i∈S
λSui
= ui
From Steps 1 and 2, u ∈ v(N ). Hence, the game is balanced
and hence has a nonempty core.
VII. RELATED WORK
Principles and concepts from cooperative game theory are
likely to substantially enrich our understanding of resource
allocation in wireless networks, particularly as many resource
allocation mechanisms depend on cooperation among nodes.
Toward this goal, Nash bargaining solutions have been pro-
posed for power control and spectrum sharing among multiple
users [10]. Coalitional games have been used recently for
modeling cooperation among nodes in the physical layer [11],
[12].
We studied cooperation in higher layers. Previous work in
this case was presented in [13] and [14]. The former con-
sidered a single-hop network with predetermined locations of
base stations, stationary customers, and fixed channel qualities.
The latter, on the other hand, studied cooperation in wire-
less secondary access networks where channel qualities and
customer locations change in time according to some known
random distribution. The current work generalizes the models
and results in [13], [14] in that we examined the problem in
which the locations of base stations are part of the decision
variables and proved the nonemptiness of the core in important
special cases. Furthermore, we considered cooperation in
multi-hop networks as well. We also investigated the resource
allocation problem in nontransferable payoff cooperative game
framework.
We now compare and contrast the proof techniques we used
with those used in related papers in cooperative games. The
duality technique applied in section III was previously used
in [13]–[18]. However, we extended this technique to more
general convex and integer optimizations.
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